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Abstract 
In this paper, we look into the risk management strategies adopted by 
farmers to manage revenue shortfall resulting from drought-induced 
yield losses. We survey literature on traditional indemnity–based 
insurance and weather index insurance. Some challenges facing the 
indemnity-based insurance were discussed and the prospects of 
resolving these challenges by using an index based risk transfer product 
called weather index insurance was analysed. The particular weather 
variable of interest was rainfall. Basis risk and methodological 
challenges were recognized as some of the major challenges to the 
uptake of weather index insurance. We showed the relationship 
between yield and cumulative precipitation indices using regression 
analyses. The hedging efficiency of the product was analysed using 
the Mean Root Square Loss (MRSL) and Conditional Tail Expectation 
(CTE) while the systemic nature of the risk was captured with Loss 
Ratios. We concluded that a strong relationship between the rainfall 
index and yield does not necessarily lead to high hedging efficiency 
and other variables would have to be taken into consideration in order 
to make the design of weather index insurance more robust. We found 
that the MRSL is more resistant to strike levels of the contracts than the 
CTE. The results from the Loss Ratio Analysis showed that spatial and 
temporal pooling of insurance contracts reduce the risk to the insurer.  
 
 
Keywords: Weather index insurance, hedging efficiency, burns analysis, 
conditional tail expectations, mean root square loss, loss ratio, quantile 
regression analysis, drought. 
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1. 1 Introduction  
 
The insurance system is getting over stretched given the frequency and intensity of 
extreme weather events in recent years (Keenan & Cleugh 2011; Parry et al. 2007). 
Although, extreme weather events like drought affect most sectors in the economy at 
least indirectly, some sectors are more vulnerable than others. The agricultural sector 
is among those sectors most vulnerable because rainfall deficit has grave implications 
on dry land crop yields and livestock grazing (Bardsley, Abey & Davenport 1984; 
Chantarat et al. 2007; Ghiulnara & Viegas 2010; Kimura & Antón 2011). Previous 
efforts to insure against the covariate nature of drought risk have been considered 
inefficient (Miranda & Glauber 1997).  
 
Recently, Kimura and Antón (2011) recommended the exploration of insurance 
markets to manage drought risk in Australia. This suggestion by Kimura and Antón 
(2011) is in tandem with that of Bardsley (1986) that the viability of rainfall insurance 
is contingent on the relationship between yield losses and the index used as proxy for 
payout for the insurance contracts and the behaviour of a portfolio of the contracts 
when aggregated over time and space. The case of weather index insurance is 
different from certain existing insurance contracts like household fire insurance in that 
drought risk is usually systemic and therefore less diversifiable.  
 
Literature on the use of weather index insurance as a means of hedging climate related 
risk is growing, but there has been a focus on temperature related risks in the energy 
industry without much consideration given to rainfall insurance as a means of hedging 
shortfalls in agricultural productions (Bokusheva 2011; Sharma & Vashishtha 2007; 
Vedenov & Barnett 2004; Yang, Brockett & Wen 2009). Researchers have related 
crop yields to weather indices but concluded that there is need for an in-depth analysis 
of crop and region specific studies (Bardsley, Abey & Davenport 1984; Turvey 2001; 
Vedenov and Barnett 2004). This region-specific analysis of rainfall insurance 
focusing on wheat was conducted by Bardsley, Abey and Davenport (1984) for some 
shires in New South Wales (NSW) in Australia, however, the data used was from 
1945 to 1969 and interstate risk pooling was not modelled. Although the authors 
agreed that pooling risk beyond NSW will lower the risk to the insurer. Given that the 
data covered only a 25 year period and the climatic realities observed within the 
period may be different from what obtains at the moment in light of climate change, 
there is need for a re-examination of the topic with a longer and more recent data.  
 
The conclusions in Bardsley (1986) suggest that weather index insurance is a possible 
tool for managing drought risk but Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) is of the view that 
there is too much hype about weather index insurance. The major challenge facing the 
prospects of weather hedging in the agricultural sector is the empirical estimation of 
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necessary parameters involved including prices and the dependence structure of the 
risk among others (Jewson & Brix 2005).   
 
The general objective of this study was to determine the viability of weather index 
insurance. More specifically, we determined the relationship between weather index 
and yield. Also, the hedging efficiency of weather index insurance was determined 
and finally, we determined the extent to which a portfolio of weather index insurance 
is diversifiable. We discussed the literature surrounding weather index insurance and 
the methodology adopted after which the analysis follows the sequence of the specific 
objectives. The paper ended with discussion of the findings and conclusion. 
 
2. Weather and Climate Risk Management in Australian Agriculture 
 
The Australian agricultural system is susceptible to extreme weather particularly 
drought risk that has become an integral part of the system. This has lead to a 
paradigmatic shift in the perception of drought as a disaster to a risk that requires self-
sufficiency on the part of the farmer as stated in the Australian Drought Policy (Kokic 
et al. 2007; Lindesay 2005; Wilhite 2005). Consequently, there is a re-assessment of 
the role of weather index insurance in the context of agricultural risk management 
particularly in Australia given its susceptibility to drought. This susceptibility and the 
consequent paradigm shift have lead to a re-examination of the role of weather index 
insurance in Australian agriculture as noted in Kimura and Anton (2011) although the 
debate on its viability remains inconclusive as observed in the work of Quiggin 
(1994):  
 
While the debate did not reach a settled conclusion, there was a consensus 
that a rainfall insurance scheme would not have a major impact in the 
absence of some subsidy at least on administrative costs. On the other hand, if 
subsidies were to be paid to farmers suffering from adverse climatic 
conditions, rainfall insurance would be one of the most cost-effective 
alternatives. (p. 123). 
 
Nevertheless, Quiggin (1986) are of the view that we can achieve reduction in the cost 
of risk if government’s policies do not deter the design of insurance schemes. 
Similarly, Zeuli and Skees (2005) opined that some benefits may be possible with 
weather index insurance and that as little as the benefits may be, it could mean much 
to farmers who are exposed and have no other cover.  
 
Weather risk, like every other risk, involves the probability and intensity of loss 
(Bodie & Merton 1998; Cuevas 2011). The economists’ position is that risk is the 
variance in the outcome that results from an action. This economist’s view is implied 
in Adam Smith’s perception of insurance as a trade that gives security to individuals 
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in that these individuals could trade their risks for a portion of their utility (Zweifel & 
Eisen 2012, p. v). This trade is primarily a trade-off between the expectation of the 
outcome and its variance (Hayman & Cox 2005, p. 119). The etymological history of 
risk emphasises choice and opportunities rather than loss and fate and the ability to 
manage variability remains a major source of entrepreneurial competitiveness 
(Bernstein 1996). Managing risks therefore involves making choices among a range 
of competing alternatives through adequate consideration of costs and benefits 
(Harwood et al 1999). There are several sources of risk in agriculture including 
drought and given that weather could no longer be treated as a force majeure, hedging 
it has become an issue of paramount importance (Kimura & Antón 2011).  
 
Enterprise diversification, crop insurance and government welfare supports are among 
alternatives that have been traditionally available to farmers to manage revenue 
fluctuations resulting from the impacts of exogenous variables on yield (Harwood et 
al. 1999). There are three layers of risk as noted in OECD work on risk management 
in agriculture (OECD 2011). The first layer is normal risk which is frequent but not 
too damaging. At the intermediate layer is the marketable risk which is more frequent 
but more damaging but not to a catastrophic extent. The third layer is catastrophic risk 
which is least frequent but most destructive. Generally, enterprise diversification is 
useful in managing the first layer of risk in that though the probability of occurrence 
of risk at this level is high; its impact is very low. At the second layer, the frequency 
of the risk is lower than the first but has a higher impact while the third layer has the 
lowest frequency but maximum impact because of its systemic nature. The second 
layer could be readily managed using market-based instruments to promote self-
reliance. This layer of risk coincides with the level of risk that farmers are willing to 
insure unlike events that have low probability with more disastrous consequences 
which are hardly given considerations in risk planning (Wright & Hewitt 1994).  
 
Given the covariate nature of drought risk at the extreme tail, drought may be 
uninsurable in the domestic market and governments have often acted as risk bearer 
of last resort (O’Meagher 2005; Quiggin, Karagiannis & Stanton 1994). Reinsurance 
has been suggested as an alternative to manage the covariance of drought risk at the 
extreme tail in that pooling the risk in a larger portfolio of risk makes it bearable for 
the reinsurer unlike a local insurance firm (Chantarat 2009). The reinsurer has the 
capacity to pool the risk over space and risk pooling over time could also provide 
additional diversification opportunities (Hoeppe & Gurenko 2006). This alternative 
makes response swift and takes the declaration of exceptional circumstances beyond 
political advocacy that has characterised government response in Australia and other 
parts of the world (Kimura & Antón 2011).   
 
Besides drought relief, governments have traditionally used multi-peril crop insurance 
to manage drought risk but the work of Wright and Hewitt (1994) described the 
objective function of multi-peril crop insurance and its basic assumptions as untenable 
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(p. 85). They noted that the main reason for the failure of all-risk insurance was that it 
is based on a theoretical model that overstates its potential value. Drought relief is one 
method the government uses to assist farmers and is not without its own criticism as 
well (Meuwissen, Van Asseldonk & Huirne 2008). The major argument is that 
drought assistance is subjective and politicised besides the equity issues it raises 
(Kimura & Antón 2011). Drought is considered as a part of agricultural endeavours 
especially in a country like Australia and government intervention has been left to 
exceptional circumstances the declaration of which is flawed (Keenan & Cleugh 
2011; Kimura & Antón 2011; Meuwissen, Van Asseldonk & Huirne 2008; Quiggin 
1994). The work of (Botterill & Wilhite 2005) shows that farmers are expected to 
manage the first and second layer of drought risk but they are yet to be empowered 
with the necessary mechanism to manage the second layer. The third layer of risk has 
been called an exceptional circumstance but its benchmarking as a once in 20 to 25 
year event is questionable given recent trends in the frequency of drought (Kimura & 
Antón 2011). The once in 20 year drought corresponds to the Bureau of 
Meteorology’s 5th percentile rainfall (BoM 2012). Since the multi-peril crop insurance 
is highly cost prohibitive given its loss ratios (Quiggin 1994; Wright & Hewitt 1994) 
and governments’ efforts are subjective, Index Based Risk Transfer Products 
(IBRTPs) have been considered as useful alternatives to managing agricultural 
production risks (Kimura & Antón 2011). A particular type of IBRTP is weather 
index insurance, an agro-insurance to prevent risk avoidance on the part of farmers.   
 
Recent experiences have shown that without significant subsidies, the agro-insurance 
market will be thin (Smith & Glauber 2012). However, Skees and Collier (2012) 
found that premium subsidies can undermine the essence of weather market. Helping 
farmers to manage their risks curtails risk avoidance that could culminate in the 
redeployment of factors of production invested in agriculture. Hence, the government 
of Australia has taken several initiatives to assist farmers but these initiatives are not 
without their accompanying inefficiencies particularly slow response, politicization 
and inequity (Kimura & Anton 2011).  
 
Generally, public agencies tend to be associated with inefficiencies and a private 
alternative is often considered as the solution which unfortunately is not always the 
case (Niskanen 1971). Subsidizing the contracts and outsourcing it to private firms 
could lead to rent seeking behaviours, besides, Smith and Glauber (1971) are of the 
view that insurance subsidy is a form of wealth transfer to farmers. This wealth 
transfer is an incentive for farmers to make sub-optimal decisions as few farmers are 
willing to pay the full price of insurance. Therefore, if individuals expect 
compensation, in whatever form, from government to offset natural disaster losses, 
they will take on additional risks. If producers do not bear the consequences of risky 
decisions, they will continue to do the things that expose them to the risk.  
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3. Weather Index Insurance and Traditional Indemnity-Based Insurance 
 
Two major types of insurance products exist namely; traditional indemnity-based 
insurance and index–based insurance. Under the traditional category are the named 
peril, multiple peril and mutual insurance products. The index-based products include 
yield and weather insurance. The payouts from traditional indemnity-based insurance 
products are based on the actual losses farmers experienced whereas some proxies are 
used as the basis for payouts under the index based products (Turvey 2001; Chantarat 
2009).  
The most commonly cited advantages of index-based insurance are that it prevents 
moral hazards and adverse selections. Moral hazard is any behaviour of the insured 
that makes him not to protect himself against losses in anticipation of indemnity 
payment. Since, weather index insurance is based on exogenous variables beyond the 
control of both counterparties to the insurance contracts the asymmetric information 
leading to the problem of moral hazard plaguing the traditional indemnity insurance 
will be resolved. The cost of monitoring moral hazards increases the cost of 
traditional insurance. It is expected that index-based proxies like precipitation and 
temperature would eliminate this cost thereby making weather index insurance 
cheaper. However, the problem of basis risk reduces this cost benefit (Yang, Brockett 
& Wen 2009).  
Basis risk could be geographic or structural. Geographic basis risk creates a gap 
between the station where the weather readings are made and the farm land insured. 
Structural basis risk refers to creating weather index insurance that is not suited for 
the particular crop. Using the currently traded precipitation derivatives used by the 
energy industry will create structural basis risk for farmers in that the product is not 
suitable for them. If the farm is located in Clifton, about 150 kilometres west of 
Brisbane (Clifton 2012), then, there will be geographic basis risk if the weather 
station in Brisbane is used for precipitation reading. To resolve the problem of basis 
risk, the contracts may have to be localized thereby reducing the expected cost 
savings of weather index insurance. 
Adverse selection is also said to be characteristic of the traditional indemnity 
insurance (Ahsan, Ali & Kurian 1982; Just, Calvin & Quiggin 1999). This is because 
those who are the most affected by the peril of interest will tend to take the insurance 
thereby creating a pool of risky contracts. Since the trade of insurance is supposed to 
divide among a great many that loss which could ruin an individual (Adams Smith in 
Zweifel & Eisen 2012, p.v), adverse selection makes this impossible as only those 
individuals who are risky are in the insurer’s pool. If farmers are able to predict the 
weather to a reasonable extent, then, adverse selection could still be possible with 
weather index insurance in that farmers would only take cover in those years when 
they are most at risk. Similarly, some locations could be at risk of droughts than the 
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others  (Agnew 2011; Hicks 2011). The implication is that farmers who are farming in 
locations at risk of drought will take drought insurance thereby creating a risky 
portfolio of insurance contracts. The adverse selection resulting from this 
geographical diversity could be aggravated if the pricing of the contracts does not 
reflect the relative susceptibility of these locations to drought. Hence, if location A is 
at higher risk than B, then the pricing should reflect this relative risk for the insured to 
feel fairly treated. Hence the need for pareto-efficiency in the pricing of weather index 
insurance contracts.  
 
Since the insurance market operates like the capital market in that it enhances the 
production capacity of farmers, it is better than non-market alternatives to managing 
their risk exposures (Quiggin & Chambers 2004). The availability of these insurance 
options raises some questions. These questions include; what insurance products are 
most suitable to cater to the needs of primary producers and what are the legal 
implications of these options? 
4. Legal Treatment of Weather Derivatives and Insurance 
 
Weather hedges could be purchased as derivatives or insurance and they have certain 
similarities and differences (Raspe 2002; Skees & Collier 2012). In terms of 
similarities, weather insurance and derivatives require the forfeiture of a premium to 
be entitled to receive payouts should a contingent event occur. There are regulatory, 
tax and accounting standard differences between the two products as noted by (Raspe 
2002). The insurance market is highly regulated while derivatives are excluded from 
too much regulatory scrutiny as long as it conforms to certain conditions (Raspe 
2002).  
In Kelly and Ball (1991), insurance contract was defined in the context of Australia 
and it was noted that three essential requirements are needed for a contract to be an 
insurance contract. The first is premium and benefit, the second being uncertainty of 
the event and finally an interest besides that created by the insurance contract itself. 
The premium paid obligates the insurer to confer value on the insured should the 
fortuitous event occur as noted in Raspe (2002). Kelly and Ball (1991) argued that 
these three requirements are also present in other contracts like warranties and 
acknowledged the difficulties involved in defining insurance contract. Kimball-
Stanley (2008) identified two basic theories in articulating the difference between 
insurance contracts and other contracts; they are legal interest test and the factual 
expectancy test. Kelly and Ball (1991) recommended an approach that focuses on the 
intention of the parties as being helpful. In particular, the intention of the assured who 
has more information peculiar to the risk, to transfer possible losses to the insurer 
confers on him (the assured) a duty of care in the form of disclosure of necessary 
information. The duty of care by both parties in the risk assessment remains a major 
distinguishing factor between insurance and other contracts.  
 7 
  
Translating this definition into the context of weather hedging, we can say that since 
meteorological information is publicly available, there is no private information to 
disclose by the assured and the insurer has limited opportunities to engage in 
malpractices. Premiums and benefits are evidently part of the contracts but the 
uncertainty is not on whether or not drought will occur, rather, when it will occur. 
Given recent advances in meteorological sciences, it may be possible to predict 
occurrence of droughts to a reasonable degree of confidence. The implication is that 
although weather information is publicly available, farmers may have enough 
information to decide on when to purchase a cover in such a way to maximize their 
own benefits at the expense of the insurer. The consequent adverse selection will lead 
to weak temporal risk pooling as farmers will not take insurance in years they are 
least likely to be drought stricken. Also, those in less drought prone areas will not take 
insurance. The implication is that as insurers tend to factor in this form of adverse 
selection into their pricing, the price of insurance will be driven upwards.  
Following the thoughts of Raspe (2002, p. 225), ‘An entity executing a weather 
derivative trade does not need to show an insurable interest. This interest is a major 
distinguishing characteristic between insurance contract and a wager. An insurance 
contract definition based on Section 1101(a)(1) of New York’s Insurance Laws given 
in Raspe (2002, p. 226) is as follows: 
[A]ny agreement or other transaction whereby one party, the “insurer”, is obligated 
to confer benefit of pecuniary value upon another party, the “insured” or 
“beneficiary”, dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous event in which the 
insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to have at the time of such happening, a 
material interest which will be adversely affected by the happening of such event.  
The insured imposes the obligation to the insurer through the premium paid and the 
occurrence of weather event remains one of the most fortuitous of all and therefore 
helps to contain moral hazard which is typical of the traditional indemnity-based 
insurance that requires proof of losses. However, the relationship between yield losses 
and the weather index on which payout is based is not in absolute tandem with the 
payout. This disparity results from structural and geographical basis risk characteristic 
of weather index insurance. Hence, there could be years when there are losses without 
payouts and years with payouts but no losses. At best, should all the years of payouts 
match with years when losses are experienced, the payouts may not be commensurate 
with the losses.  
In essence, value is conferred on the insurer on the basis of the weather index but the 
material insurable interest is the observed yield which translates into utility in the 
form of revenue. The case of weather index insurance is similar to the amphibious 
nature of preferred stock that stands between equity and debt with its unique legal 
standards.  
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Recent studies seem to implicitly suggest that the structure of insurance contracts 
follow the same structure as that of derivatives without any proof of loss but an 
insurable interest exists (Chantarat 2009; Kapphan, Calanca & Holzkaemper 2012). It 
seems that the function of weather index insurance may not be different from weather 
derivatives but they require a well-articulated legal distinction to prevent abuse of the 
classification and regulatory frameworks guiding derivatives and insurance. Failure to 
regulate the products may create new risks (Kimball-Stanley 2008). Some authors 
(Chantarat 2009; Kapphan 2012) in their reports interchangeably used insurance and 
derivatives because of the functional convergence between the two products.  
The possible mismatch in the payout and yield loss suggests that weather index 
insurance may not completely satisfy the conditions of insurance like the traditional 
indemnity-based insurance. Hence, in defining what constitutes insurance, there is 
need to differentiate between indemnity-based insurance and index-based insurance. 
A major similarity between the two insurance types is that they both require insurable 
interests but there is no need for proof of loss in the case of index-based insurance. 
The index-based insurance is also different from weather derivatives in that 
derivatives do not necessarily require an insurable interest. 
Skees and Collier (2012) noted that weather hedges could be purchased as over-the-
counter weather index products which are tailored to individual needs of the clientele 
or as actively traded standardized exchange traded derivatives. Given the nature of the 
response of different crops in different regions to weather variables, exchange traded 
weather derivatives may not be practical in the context of agriculture because the 
patronage for standardized contracts will be limited. Vortex (2012) effectively 
summarized these differences in terms of eligibility to purchase the hedging product, 
accounting treatment, liquidity, flexibility and regulatory control.  
5. Weather Index Insurance and Climate Change 
 
It is a well-established fact that weather variability is the major source of yield 
fluctuations  (Dai, Trenberth & Qian 2004; Kapphan, Calanca & Holzkaemper 2012) 
and that weather variability will be exacerbated by Climate Change with a consequent 
effect on yield (Keenan & Cleugh 2011). The old saying that; ‘however big floods get, 
there will always be a bigger one coming ...’, is therefore true in relation to climate 
change and drought (President’s water Comm. in Gumbel (1958). However, Kapphan, 
Calanca and Holzkaemper (2011, p. 33) concluded that increase in weather risk, 
particularly exacerbated by climate change, generates a huge potential for the 
insurance industry. They showed that when hedging with contracts adjusted for future 
climate scenarios, benefits almost triple for the insured while profits increase by 
240% for the insurer. The implication is that weather index insurance would become 
more profitable for both counterparties if it is updated to capture latest weather 
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information. In the study, it was further noted that insurers could suffer losses if future 
contracts do not capture changes in weather distributions over the coming years.  
 
Skees and Collier (2012) noted that the price of weather hedging will increase as 
climate change increases weather risk. Consequently, the capacity of those at risk 
could be impeded by the exorbitant prices that could prohibit the insured from taking 
the insurance leading to insufficient demand. The low demand could have resulted in 
economy of scale for the insurer offering the product. They noted that the price of the 
insurance will increase for three reasons namely; increases in pure risk, the potential 
size of losses and ambiguity of the risk. The link between climate change and the 
price of weather insurance is due to the fact that the pricing is of the contract is done 
using Historical Burns Analysis. Burns analysis involves the use of historical data to 
estimate the fair premium of insurance. Hence, as there is a change in the data trend, 
there will be a corresponding shift in the statistical parameters used in the estimation 
of the prices. This model assumes that the insurer’s profit over the years is zero as the 
premium is assumed to cover all indemnities only (Chantarat 2009; Jewson & Brix 
2005; Kapphan, Calanca & Holzkaemper 2011).  
6. Global Experience in the use of Weather Index Insurance 
 
Weather index insurance has been successfully used in some countries while it is been 
pilot tested in others and further researches are being undertaken in this area  
(Gurenko 2006; Sharma & Vashishtha 2007). The case of Mongolia was emphasized 
by Skees (2008) as a model for Low Income Countries (LICs). The Mongolian case is 
a typical example of how index insurance could be used to hedge livestock losses. 
The drought and harsh winter in the early 2000s in Mongolia lead to losses of about a 
third of the country’s cattle. The disaster was financed through a loan agreement with 
the World Bank to finance a tranche of index–based livestock insurance. In Honduras, 
the use of weather index insurance has been found to be effective among smallholder 
farmers (Nieto et al. 2012). The study by Bardsley, Abey and Davenport (1984) 
focused on European agriculture. In the study, it was noted that perception of risk by 
scientists and farmers are not necessarily in congruence and that a theoretically 
promising risk management instrument may not necessarily work well for farmers. 
This divergence in risk perception could partly explain the friction in the uptake of 
weather index insurance by farmers. The study concluded that risk perception varies 
considerably across EU member states.  Another important conclusion of the study 
was that risk management solutions need to be ‘tailor-made’ to cater to the diversity 
in risk perception and exposure among the EU states. 
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7. Methodological framework  
 
7.1: Data and data processing: The rainfall data used is based on the available data 
from the Bureau of Meteorology of Australia (BoM 2012) and the yield data from the 
Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries (Potgieter, Hammer & Doherty 2012). 
The actual yield data is not available for a sufficiently reasonable period of time so 
the simulated data was used. Although the simulated yield data is available from 1900 
till 2011, the precipitation data is not sufficiently available over the same period in 
many shires. Hence, a 40–year period was used from 1971 till 2010. There were 
missing data in this period as well but experts were of the view that such missing data 
are better taken as zero readings rather than using average values to substitute the 
missing data.   
 
There are different types of indices that could be used in the design of weather index 
insurance (Chantarat et al. 2012; Dai, Trenberth & Qian 2004; Kapphan, Calanca & 
Holzkaemper 2011; Turvey 2001). However, the Standardized Precipitation Index 
(SPI) was used because it is relatively simplistic in comparison to the likes of Palmer 
Drought Severity Index, Reconaissance Drought Index and others. The SPI is 
calculated using the standardized values of rainfall. The season was divided into 
dekads (ten day periods) and the SPI for each dekad was summed up to form the 
Cumulative SPI (CSPI) which was used for benchmarking. The benchmarking was 
done at percentile levels. For example, the 5
th
 percentile benchmark will imply that 
the contracts will pay out twice in the 40–year period, the 10th percentile pays out 
four years with the lowest SPI in the period while the 30th percentile pays out 12 
years of the 40 years. The analysis was done with equal weightage of the dekads in 
the season and then with optimized weightage. However, the emphasis was on the 
optimized weightage because the optimized weights lead to a stronger relationship 
between yield and the index. The equal weighting implies that each 10–day period in 
the season equally influences crop yield whereas the optimized weightage implies that 
some dekads have more impact than the others. The GRG nonlinear algorithm in 
Microsoft Excel package was used to allocate weights that maximize the yield-index 
relationship. In all cases the relationship was stronger when weights were optimized. 
The commencement of the season for Queensland shires is around 1
st
 of June while it 
is approximately 1
st
 of April in Western Australia, depending on the shire. The 
periods covered by the contracts were from sowing to the commencement of maturity 
over an approximately 180–day period from the commencement of the season. The 
rainfall (in millimetres) was accumulated in dekads. We assumed a soil maximum 
water retention capacity of 60mm for all the shires. This is because rainfall above this 
amount may not contribute to plant growth (Stoppa & Hess 2003). 
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The following optimization problem was adopted to obtain the weights for the dekads:  
 
 
Where ri* is the actual rainfall in period i, and CAPi is the amount of rainfall in the 
particular dekad or period i above which additional rainfall will not increase wheat 
yield. 
  
Where n is the total number of 10-day periods in the growing season which in our 
case is 18 ten-day periods, ωi, is the weight assigned to the period i of the growing 
season, rit  is the effective rainfall in period i of year t and   = Cumulative 
Standardized Precipitation Index for each year (t), 
The weights, ωi, were chosen to maximize the sample correlation between the rainfall 
index and yield based on the yield data from 1971 to 2010. 
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
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Where: Yt is the yield in year t,  = average yield. These values vary from shire to 
shire across both states.  
7.2: Payout procedure: The contract design follows a put option design as described 
in Turvey (2001), however, we follow the indemnity structure in Stoppa and Hess 
(2003) for simplicity. The rainfall index derivative based on the Cumulative 
Standardized Precipitation Index ( ) must be below an alpha (5
th
, 10
th
 and 30
th
) 
percentile threshold ( ) for payout to occur. The payment was designed to be 
proportional to the extent to which the index is below the threshold. The value of  
is the sum of the values obtained by multiplying the rainfall index in each period (i) of 
a particular year (t) by the specific weight (ωi) assigned to the period i.  
*max ,i i ir r CAP   
t
n
cz i iti
R r
 12 
  
 
0 if   
*
t
t
t
cz
cz
cz
R T
Indemnity LiabilityT R
ifR T
T





 

 
 Where:         
tcz
R Cumulative Standardized Precipitation Index for each year t ; 
 percentile threshold,T   
th th th 5 ,  10 and 30 percentiles     
The liability is the insurable interest or the value of a hectare of wheat which was 
estimated using the average yield and the average monetary value of wheat. The price 
is assumed to be the same for all shires because the national export price was used but 
average yield differs from shire to shire. Hence, we  are analysing the effect of 
weather index insurance on the revenue of a representative wheat farmer in each shire 
who took the average national price of $183.71 per hectare of wheat harvested (ABS    
2012) over the 40-year period. Since the price is constant across the shires over the 
period under consideration, our analyses basically focus on the effect of weather 
derivatives or insurance on the hedgibility of the representative farmer’s revenue 
resulting from the stochastic nature of wheat yield.  
7.3: Data Analyses:  
7.3.1: Objective 1: To determine the relationship between the weather index and 
yield. 
 
To achieve the first objective, the Ordinary Least Square Regression (OReg) was 
adopted in an attempt to find the relationship between the weather index and yield. 
However, since the OReg assumes uniform slope across the yield-index continuum, 
the Quantile Regression (QReg) was utilized to study the strength of the relationship 
at different quantiles on the continuum (Adeyinka & Kaino 2012; Koenker 2005) The 
PReg (Panel Regression) analysis was used to determine the effect of location on the 
analysis. In essence, we sought to know whether or not different indices are required 
for different locations (Panel effect) (Chantarat 2009).  
7.3.2: Objective 2: To determine the hedging efficiency of weather index insurance 
The Standard Deviation (SD) may not be an appropriate measure of risk since we are 
interested in the downside risk. Value at Risk (VaR) also has its short coming because 
it is considered incoherent and does not satisfy the required axioms of an appropriate 
risk measure (Acerbi & Tasche 2001). Therefore, the Conditional Tail Expectation 
(CTE) and Mean Root Square Loss (MRSL), otherwise called Root Mean Square 
Loss (RMSL), were used to measure the hedging efficiency of the insurance at 
different strike levels (Vedenov & Barnett 2004). The CTE analysis in this study is 
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measured at the 5th, 10th and 30th percentiles. That is, we analyse the expected 
revenue in the worst 2, 4 and 12 years in the 40–year period. The purpose of this 
analysis is to know whether or not insurance will increase the revenue of farmers in 
the worst two years of rainfall, the worst four years of rainfall and the worst 12 years 
of rainfall in the 40-year period. If the contract is efficient, then, the utility of the 
farmer, measured in terms of revenue, should increase in years when droughts are 
experienced.   
The Mean Root Square Loss (MRSL) is another measure of risk and is appropriate in 
this context because the minimization of the semi-variance rather than the full 
variance is of relevance since farmers are mainly interested in managing their 
downside losses (Vedenov & Barnett 2004). Given the different contracts (5th, 10th 
and 30th percentile contracts), the MRSL was calculated in an attempt to observe the 
extent to which the downside risk is minimized. Hence, if the MRSL reduces with 
insurance, then the contract is efficient at that strike level or contract.  
The revenue without contract is given by: It = pYt  and with contract is: Itα = pYt + β - θ 
Where; It = revenue at time t without insurance, p= wheat price, Itα = revenue at time t 
with alpha percentile level of insurance, Yt = yield at time t, βαt = insurance payout for 
that level of insurance in that year and θα = the yearly premium for that level of 
insurance and is constant throughout the years in question so it is written as θ, MRSL 
is the Mean Root Square Loss without insurance and MRSLα is the Mean Root 
Square Loss with an alpha level of insurance. These values differ by location but a 
location subscript is not included in the formula for simplicity.  
2
1
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7.3.3: Objective 3: To determine the diversifiability of a portfolio of weather index 
insurance 
 
The Loss Ratio (Lt) is the ratio of the indemnity paid to premiums collected. Pooling 
the premiums and indemnities across different shires and over time helps to examine 
the spatial and temporal covariate structure of the risk. The Lt is calculated as follows:  
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 and when pooled over time, it becomes; 
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

   
П=Indemnities, P = Premium, L=locations (18 shires, 8 from Queensland and 10 
from Western Australia), τ=time (the pooling was based on 1, 2, 5 and 10 years). 
If Lt is lower than 1 (Lt<1) , it indicates that the premium collected is more than the 
indemnities paid and therefore the insurer makes a profit, when it is 1 (Lt = 1), it 
implies a breakeven in that the indemnities paid is exactly equal to the premium and 
when it is above 1 (Lt >1), it means that the insurer experienced a loss for that period 
in that indemnities paid is more than the premium collected (See Chantarat2009 pp. 
108 – 110).  
8. Summary of Results 
8.1: Descriptive statistics 
Seasonal capped rainfall (in millimetres –mm) was higher in Western Australia (WA) 
than in Queensland (QLD) with Boddington having as much as 430.80mm of rainfall 
and Kondinin with 179.19mm. In Queensland, Clifton experienced an average of 
266.69mm of rainfall and the lowest was in Balonne with 183.30mm. The standard 
deviations (SDs) and Coefficients of Variation (CV) were higher in Queensland than 
in Western Australia. The CV is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. The 
standard deviation and CV for yield show the same trend implying that farmers 
assume more risk per unit of production in Queensland than in Western Australia. In 
terms of skewness in the distribution of rainfall, Ravensthorpe is the most negatively 
skewed with a value of -1.33 while Katanning with 0.85 skewness is the most 
positively skewed. This implies that Ravensthorpe obtains frequent modest rainfall 
and few droughts but Katanning experiences more frequent mild rainfall deficits but 
few flooding. Positive skewness in yield is highest for Booringa with the value of 1.43 
and negative skewness for Katanning was -3.14 to be the most negatively skewed 
location in terms of yield. It could be intuitively concluded that a portfolio of weather 
index insurance would be more volatile in Western Australia than in Queensland 
given the skewness of the data although Queensland farmers tend to bear more risk 
per unit of wheat production as shown by the yield coefficient of variation.    
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The pricing of the insurance contract was done using the actuarial burns analysis to 
reflect the historical nature of the risk. The Black-Scholes pricing model was 
inappropriate because the underlying index is not traded. It was noted that the pricing 
of the products rises with strike levels (See Appendix 1). For example, Balonne was 
4.67%, 5.55% and 15.90% at the 5
th
, 10
th
 and 30
th
 percentiles respectively. Boyup 
Brook was the cheapest for the 10
th
 and 30
th
 percentile contracts in terms of the 
percentage of the insurable interest paid as premium (3.44% and 6.83% respectively). 
However, both CTE and MRSL revealed that the Boyup Brook contract hedged 
revenue losses at all percentile strikes whereas more expensive contracts did not 
necessarily provide any hedging advantage. The 5
th
 percentile strike paid as much as 
4.73% of the insurable interest as premium annually in Millmerran to be the second 
most expensive for this strike level without adding value to the revenue of the farmer 
under both MRSL and CTE. It seems that the actuarial burns analysis does not capture 
the relative efficiency of the contracts.  
Table 0.1: Descriptive Statistics of yield and 60mm cap dekadal rainfall for all locations 
  Rainfall Yield 
Station 
numbers 
Queensland Mean 
(mm) 
SD CV Skewness Mean 
(t/ha) 
 
SD CV Skewness 
048020 Balonne 183.30 81.80 0.45 0.09 1.18 0.49 0.42 -0.54 
043060 Booringa 202.10 84.25 0.42 0.61 1.29 0.59 0.46 1.43 
043043 Bendemere 225.69 96.39 0.43 0.31 1.59 0.56 0.35 0.21 
043093 Bungil 205.93 82.54 0.40 0.66 1.67 0.65 0.39 0.40 
035070 Taroom 218.48 96.02 0.44 -0.03 1.27 0.56 0.44 -0.32 
052020 Waggamba 198.91 83.82 0.42 0.42 1.41 0.51 0.36 -0.12 
041018 Clifton 266.69 86.98 0.33 -0.17 2.66 0.44 0.17 -0.72 
041069 Millmerran 252.74 89.00 0.35 0.18 2.24 0.36 0.16 -0.42 
                     Western Australia 
009575 Boddington 430.80 82.21 0.19 0.1 2.70 0.25 0.09 -3.03 
009504 Boyup Brook 388.95 72.40 0.19 0.14 3.04 0.47 0.15 -3.13 
010526 Broomehill 203.37 51.05 0.25 0.45 2.83 0.40 0.14 -2.77 
010006 Bruce Rock 182.22 50.93 0.28 0.13 1.97 0.27 0.14 -1.33 
010536 Corrigin 235.63 50.80 0.22 0.36 2.08 0.30 0.14 -0.94 
010579 Katanning 294.92 63.58 0.22 0.85 2.74 0.32 0.12 -3.14 
010513 Kondinin 179.19 52.32 0.29 0.72 2.09 0.21 0.10 -0.24 
010121 Tammin 229.66 60.64 0.26 0.54 2.53 0.22 0.09 -1.47 
010626 Pingelly 267.46 59.06 0.22 0.59 2.46 0.07 0.03 -0.77 
010019 Ravensthorpe 235.35 61.02 0.26 -1.33 2.25 0.12 0.05 0.64 
*CV=Coefficient of variation; mm = millimetres; (t/ha) = tonnes per hectare; SD = Standard deviation 
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8.2: Objective 1: Relationship between weather index and yield 
 
As could be seen in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, when the season is divided into dekads and 
they are optimized, the match between yield losses and payouts tend to increase. The 
extent to which these matches are improved is the extent to which optimizing the 
weights of the contracts increases the correlations between yield and the weather 
index. In Figure 1.1, the highest yield loss was experienced in 1995 and it would have 
been expected that the three contracts will pay out this year, only the 30
th
 percentile 
contract paid a meagre 6.56% of the insurable interest. With optimization (Figure 1.2) 
the situation improved as the 5
th
 percentile contract paid out 86.93% while the 10
th
 
and 30
th
 percentile contracts paid 91.08% and 96.20% respectively. In the optimized 
model, the 100% pay outs also corresponded to year 2002 when 83.79% of the highest 
historical yield losses were experienced in contrast to the year 1991 when only 
28.74% of the loss was experienced in the equally weighted contracts. This analysis 
shows the importance of considering the susceptibility of yield to water stress at the 
various phases of the crop growth cycle.  
 
Figure 1.1: Pay out yield loss matches for equally weighted contracts in Balonne 
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Figure 1.2: Pay out yield loss matches for optimized contracts in Balonne 
 
Balonne and Ravensthorpe shires are used to demonstrate the effect of strike levels 
and optimization on weather index insurance contracts because their results were 
consistent under the two hedging efficiency measures used. In Balonne, the 5
th
 and 
10
th
 percentile contracts matched with years when losses were experienced. That is, 
the two years with payouts matched with two of the eighteen years when yield losses 
were experienced under the 5
th
 percentile contract. The trend is the same for the 10
th
 
percentile contract with and without optimization as seen in Table 1.1. However, at 
the 30
th
 percentile strike, two of the 12 years of payment were mismatched in that 
there was payment when the farmer did not actually experience any loss under the 
equally weighted regime. This mismatch was corrected with the optimized contract as 
all the 12 years of payouts matched with 12 of the 18 years when yield losses were 
experienced.  
 
In the case of Ravensthorpe, the 5
th
 and 10
th
 percentile contracts followed the same 
trend as in Balonne, however, optimization reduced the mismatch in the payouts and 
losses from 4 to 3 only. It should therefore be expected that the hedging efficiency of 
the optimized contract will be lower in Ravensthorpe than in Balonne because of the 
mismatches that the optimization of the weights could not correct.  
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Table 1.1: Typical Payout-loss matches for Balonne and Ravensthorpe 
Shire Losses and 
payments 
Equally weighted Optimized contracts 
5th 10th 30th 5th 10th 30th 
Balonne 
Queensland 
Pay no loss 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Loss no pay 16 14 8 16 14 6 
Matching 
years 
2 4 10 2 4 12 
Total pays 2 4 12 2 4 12 
Total losses 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ravensthorpe  
Western 
Australia 
Pay no loss 0 0 4 0 0 3 
Loss no pay 13 11 7 13 11 6 
Matching 
years 
2 4 8 2 4 9 
Total pays 2 4 12 2 4 12 
Total losses 15 15 15 15 15 15 
 
In all cases, optimization increased the linear relationship between the index and yield 
as indicated by the correlation coefficients (ro and re). For Balonne, the correlation 
increased from 58.69% to 83.72% after optimization of the weights. The R square 
value based on the optimized contract should have been the square of the pearson 
correlation coefficient, 70.09% (.8372
2
), however the adjusted-R-square was reported 
to make it comparable with models with more than one covariate should they be built 
in the future. Adjusted-R-square is a measure of the statistical efficiency of the 
models. The adjusted-R-square for Balonne is 69% indicating that the weather index 
explained 69% of the variation in yield. The highest statistical relationship between 
yield and index was experienced in Booringa shire with 89.77% of the variation in 
yield being explained by the weather index. This is followed by Bendemere and 
Clifton with R square adjusted values of 79.64% and 79.49% respectively. The lowest 
R square adjusted values were obtained in Katanning (22.29%), Broomehill (23.24%) 
and Bungil 34.66%. The distribution of the pseudo R square varies from shire to shire. 
Booringa indicated the strongest relationship based on the adjusted-R-square, a 
breakdown of this relationship into quantiles indicated that the relationship is loaded 
at the uppertail for Booringa which showed 76.07% and 78.50% at the 95
th
 and 90
th
 
percentiles respectively. Bungil’s quantile analysis tended more towards normality in 
that it showed an increase at the lower quantiles  and peaked at 27.07% in the median 
(50
th
 percentile) and declined after the median. Boddington shire showed a decreasing 
trend across the quantiles except at the 90
th
 percentile.  
The Panel Data Regression Analysis (PReg) as shown in Appendix 2 indicated that 
there is a panel effect among all the shires from both states and in each of the shires in 
each of the states of Queensland and Western Australia. The Random Effect (RE) was 
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preferred over the Fixed Effect (FE) in the PReg because the Hausman test indicated 
the choice of RE for all the shires in each of the two states and all states when pooled 
together. The implication of the panel effect is that each shire will require different 
indices to capture the relationship between weather and yield and so a generic index 
will not suffice. This diversity may be due to differences in soil types and other 
variations across the states. The results of the RE for each of the states and both states 
indicated that there is a very strong relationship between the index and yield and 
therefore weather index could be a viable proxy for yield in calculating insurance 
premiums and payouts to wheat farmers (P<0.05).  
Table 1.2: Regression and correlation analysis of yield and weather index 
 Pseudo R square for QReg at different quantiles Adjusted 
R square 
for OReg 
ro re 
Shires 5th 10th 30th 50th 70th 90th 95th 
Queensland 
Balonne 53.07 54.17 52.14 49.35 40.14 20.68 15.33 69.00 83.72 58.69 
Booringa 47.97 53.08 56.44 64.36 72.02 78.5 76.07 89.77 94.88 86.86 
Bendemere 57.07 60.37 58.06 57.91 59.15 54.08 48.92 79.64 89.53 72.11 
Bungil 4.66 12.15 25.17 27.07 23.05 14.73 0.79 34.66 60.28 26.08 
Taroom 35.21 38.27 43.98 41.62 33.48 35.32 36.52 57.42 76.49 56.46 
Waggamba 51.24 52.06 55.84 56.97 51.27 43.31 35.23 77.43 88.32 72.97 
Clifton 67.26 62.13 58.51 55.82 50.44 43.51 41.26 79.49 89.45 71.31 
Millmerran 47.53 42.93 45.66 46.57 40.47 43.26 47.47 68.08 83.00 63.82 
Western Australia 
Boddington 55.52 45.4 13.43 3.41 0.27 0.34 0.16 46.33 69.07 45.67 
Boyup Brook 59.32 43.48 18.52 12.53 9.82 2.4 2.98 49.14 71.02 37.24 
Broomehill 40.55 25.18 4.1 1.25 0.67 5.1 0.63 23.24 50.20 27.72 
Bruce Rock 16.73 14.06 7.62 19.92 18.55 2.05 0.06 41.88 65.85 43.28 
Corrigin 53.4 47.08 29.22 28.8 16.96 9.55 5.38 46.16 68.95 48.69 
Katanning 33.92 23.9 10.44 8.69 2.97 0.06 0.13 22.29 49.28 18.17 
Kondinin 42.67 42.68 30.8 26.18 20.75 18.35 19.06 44.65 67.84 52.45 
Tammin 47.11 42.91 35.32 34.19 20.7 7.81 5.58 51.43 72.86 54.61 
Pingelly 51.02 51.92 44.95 33.48 32.4 18.97 14.89 61.62 79.12 58.20 
Ravensthorpe  46.63 40.31 29.76 21.46 14.35 2.59 0.46 45.17 68.24 54.79 
*re = Pearson correlation of yield and index for equally weighted contracts, ro = Pearson correlation of yield 
and index for optimally weighted contracts, QReg = Quantile regression analysis for optimally weighted 
contract,  OReg = Ordinary Least Square Regression for optimally weighted contract.  
 
8.3: Objective 2: Hedging Efficiency 
8.3.1: Kernel Density Plots of efficient and inefficient contracts 
The Figure 2.1 shows the risk reducing effect of weather index insurance in Balonne 
shire. The variance in revenue is widest without insurance whereas with the insurance 
contracts, especially the 30
th
 percentile contract, the farmer reduced variance in 
revenue. The case of an inefficient contract is shown in Figure 2.2 for Ravensthorpe 
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where the insurance makes the farmer worse off. All three contracts made the farmer 
worse off than in Ravensthorpe but better off in Balonne.  
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Figure 2.1: Risk reduction effect of an efficient weather index insurance contract – the 
case of Balonne.
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Figure 2.2: Risk increasing effect of an inefficient weather index insurance 
contract – the case of Ravensthorpe 
 
8.3.2: Mean Root Square Loss and Hedging Efficiency 
The Mean Root Square Loss (MRSL) reduces when a contract is efficient. The 5
th
, 
10
th
 and 30
th
 percentile contracts were compared with the case without insurance. 
Balonne shire showed a 7.44% reduction in risk when the 5
th
 percentile contract is 
used. The highest reduction was achieved in Broomehill with a 45.83% reduction with 
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the 5
th
 percentile insurance contract. Pingelly shire’s risk increased by 75.08% to be 
the worst with the 5
th
 percentile contract. Only twelve of the 18 shires showed 
evidence of risk reductions when MRSL is used as a measure of hedging efficiency at 
the 5
th
 percentile. For the 10
th
 percentile contracts, Broomehill as in the 5
th
 percentile 
contract, has the highest risk reduction with the contract. The risk in Broomehill 
reduced by 49.05%. Pingelly shire also has the highest increment in risk under the 
10
th
 percentile contract as in the 5
th
 percentile with an increase of 92.95%. For the 30
th
 
percentile contract, Pingelly remains the shire with the highest increment in risk of 
253.42% but Boyup Brook reduced the semi-variance by 55.33% to be the shire with 
the highest risk reduction at the 30
th
 percentile. Twelve of the shires showed risk 
reduction with the 5
th
 and 30
th
 percentile insurance contracts while risks were reduced 
for thirteen shires using the 10
th
 percentile contracts.  
 
Table 2.1: Mean Root Square Loss Analyses 
Shires by 
states 
Without 
contract 
Strikes in percentiles 
5th 10th 30th 
With 
contract 
($) 
Chang
es (%) 
With 
contract  
($) 
Changes 
(%) 
With 
contract($) 
Changes (%) 
QLD        
Balonne 68.80 63.68 -7.44 63.46 -7.76 47.94 -30.32 
Booringa 57.22 57.63 0.72 59.59 4.14 56 -2.13 
Bendemere 69.61 65.69 -5.63 64.84 -6.85 58.21 -16.38 
Bungil 76.76 74.39 -3.09 74.09 -3.48 78.8 2.66 
Taroom 76.16 78.43 2.98 80.61 5.84 71.86 -5.65 
Waggamba 66.39 62.84 -5.35 63.47 -4.40 55.25 -16.78 
Clifton 61.78 56.59 -8.40 55.83 -9.63 48.96 -20.75 
Millmerran 49.48 49.44 -0.08 48.61 -1.76 47.09 -4.83 
WA        
Boddington 42.97 32.53 -24.30 25.56 -40.52 29.43 -31.51 
Boyup 
Brook 
78.68 45.52 -42.15 43.27 -45.01 35.15 -55.33 
Broomehill 65.5 35.48 -45.83 33.37 -49.05 53.95 -17.63 
Bruce 
Rock 
40.37 33.86 -16.13 30.92 -23.41 33.54 -16.92 
Corrigin 42.83 39.77 -7.14 40.06 -6.47 45.65 6.58 
Katanning 51.34 32.18 -37.32 35.62 -30.62 64.11 24.87 
Kondinin 27.8 30.53 9.82 30.15 8.45 32.43 16.65 
Tammin 33.72 35.8 6.17 32.2 -4.51 33.09 -1.87 
Pingelly 9.79 17.14 75.08 18.89 92.95 34.6 253.42 
Ravensthor
pe 
17.76 19.21 8.16 24.4 37.39 46.16 159.91 
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8.3.3: Conditional Tail Expectation and Hedging Efficiency 
When the value of Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE) increases when contracts are 
purchased, then the contract is efficient at that level for the location. CTE is calculated 
for the case with and without insurance at the different strikes and the alpha level 
corresponding to the strikes. For example, the 5% CTE was calculated for the revenue 
without insurance and compared with the 5% CTE for the revenue with the 5
th
 
percentile insurance contract whereas the 10% CTE was used to evaluate the 
efficiency of the revenue without insurance and the revenue with the 10
th
 percentile 
contracts. The same approach was used for the 30
th
 percentile strike. At the 5
th
 
percentile strike, Balonne recorded an increase in revenue from $57.25 to $62. This is 
8.3% increase in utility. That is, the representative farmer in Balonne after accounting 
for the premium in the worst two years of rainfall in the 40-year period had sufficient 
payout to make him better off than the situation without insurance.  At the 10
th
 
percentile strike, there was a 10.40% increase and only 5.49% at the 30
th
 percentile 
strike. Fourteen out of the eighteen shires were better off with the 5
th
 percentile 
contract. Boyup Brook had the highest change of 21.21% as revenue increased from 
$373.86 to $453.14 at the 5
th
 percentile strike. Taroom shire was the worst among the 
shires that were worse off with insurance as revenue declined from $60.15 without 
insurance to $50.50 with insurance implying a 16.04% decrease in revenue for the 
representative farmer in the shire over the period in view. 
 
For the 10
th
 percentile contract, Balonne’s revenue increased from $90.26 by 10.40% 
to $99.65. Taroom shire’s revenue decreased from $91.34 to $81.37, a decrease of 
10.92%. Taroom was also the worst shire with the 5
th
 percentile contract. For the 30
th
 
percentile strike contract, Balonne increased in utility by 5.49% to be the shire 
deriving the highest benefit from the insurance while Katanning experienced the 
worst revenue change under the same contract strike level with a reduction in revenue 
by 10.91% although the shire was better off with the 5
th
 and 10
th
 percentile contracts. 
The 5
th
 percentile contract was efficient in fourteen locations and the 10
th
 percentile 
contract was efficient in eleven locations while the 30
th
 percentile contract was 
efficient for only seven locations using CTE as a measure of hedging efficiency. It is 
obvious that the changes were highest at the most extreme tails and most shires would 
be better off with insurance at the most extreme tail than when droughts are mild as is 
the case at the 30
th
 percentile strike level. The implication is that the benefit from 
drought insurance to the insured decreases as the strike level increases.  
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Table 2.2: Conditional Tail Expectations Analysis of Queensland and Western 
Australian shires. 
 5%  strike 10% strike 30% strike 
Shires 
 
Without 
contract 
($) 
 
With 
contract  
($) 
Change 
(%) 
 
Without 
contract 
($) 
With 
contract 
($) 
Change 
(%) 
Without 
contract 
($) 
With 
contract 
($) 
Change 
(%) 
QLD          
Balonne 57.25 62 8.30 90.26 99.65 10.40 183.47 193.54 5.49 
Booringa 118.83 121.79 2.49 136.65 134.35 -1.68 186.07 187.48 0.76 
Bendemere 129.48 145.06 12.03 165.97 179.15 7.94 247.33 256.68 3.78 
Bungil 145.17 151.79 4.56 170.06 172.45 1.41 252.22 260.41 3.25 
Taroom 60.15 50.5 -16.04 91.34 81.37 -10.92 193 194.11 0.58 
Waggamba 114.05 120.52 5.67 141.07 145.43 3.09 220.43 230.39 4.52 
Clifton 342.88 350.63 2.26 376.54 385.95 2.50 459.14 452.44 -1.46 
Millmerran 300.89 279.19 -7.21 325.45 322.85 -0.80 385.44 380.94 -1.17 
WA          
Boddington 390.91 415.88 6.39 438.58 459.53 4.78 488.62 465.15 -4.80 
Boyup Brook 373.86 453.14 21.21 456.75 497.07 8.83 537.23 537.56 0.06 
Broomehill 364.3 432.68 18.77 431.78 461.61 6.91 501.46 464.7 -7.33 
Bruce Rock 257.9 280.1 8.61 293.83 306.74 4.39 345.72 333.73 -3.47 
Corrigin 274.25 291.02 6.11 309.12 314.22 1.65 362.55 343.67 -5.21 
Katanning 388.88 427.52 9.94 433.16 440.06 1.59 490.32 436.84 -10.91 
Kondinin 318.56 319.11 0.17 334.23 330.37 -1.15 368.07 357.24 -2.94 
Tammin 382.56 383.29 0.19 411.15 410.93 -0.05 452.88 436.18 -3.69 
Pingelly 428.35 418.06 -2.40 433.53 417.43 -3.71 447.39 408.7 -8.65 
Ravensthorpe 370.11 368.12 -0.54 382.6 376.76 -1.53 406.96 367.92 -9.59 
 
8.4: Objective 3: Diversification 
 
8.4.1: The effect of temporal risk pooling on a portfolio of weather index 
insurance contracts 
 
For the 5
th
 percentile contract in Table 3.1, the probability of a high profit was highest 
for a single year and two year pooling but this is also associated with high probability 
of loss. The lowest probability of loss ratio being less than 0.5 occurs when risk is 
pooled over ten years (19%). This decline from 73% for a single year pooling to only 
19% for a ten-year pool is the cost of having no loss ratio greater than 3 for the ten 
year risk pooling. This trend persisted across the other strike levels. In addition, an 
increase in strike levels further tempered the risk in that the probability of extreme 
values decreases as movements are made to higher strike levels across the various 
years of pooling. This climaxed in zero probabilities for loss ratios less than 0.5 and 
greater than 3 for the 30
th
 percentile strikes for ten years of risk pooling. Hence, one 
could conclude that temporal risk pooling, particularly at higher strike levels reduces 
systemic risk to the insurer. This analysis confirms the intuition that drought risks are 
most systemic at the tail in that extreme drought will affect several locations 
 24 
  
simultaneously whereas moderate droughts are less systemic, and we also observed 
that insurers could make profits from bearing the risk in the long term.  
 
Table 3.1: Loss ratio probability by strike level and years of pooling 
Probability 
of loss ratio 
Strike = 5% Strike = 10% Strike = 30% 
Years of risk pooling Years of risk pooling Years of risk pooling 
1 2 5 10 1 2 5 10 1 2 5 10 
<0.5 0.73 0.58 0.39 0.19 0.65 0.51 0.36 0.10 0.50 0.26 0.03 0.00 
0.5 to ≤1 0.05 0.10 0.31 0.68 0.08 0.18 0.22 0.71 0.13 0.28 0.56 0.65 
1 to ≤ 2 0.10 0.20 0.28 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.39 0.19 0.20 0.36 0.41 0.35 
2 to ≤ 3 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 
> 3 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
8.4.2: The effect of spatial risk pooling on weather index insurance 
 
From Table 3.2, it is obvious that the risk could be spatially pooled. Although there 
were some years when both Queensland and Western Australia shires had non-zero 
loss ratios, the values of the loss ratios show that they did not experience droughts to 
the same extent. Year 2010 is the most extreme case in that while Western Australia 
experienced drought with an accompanying loss ratio of 22.76, Queensland 
experienced no drought payout because of the flood experienced in the state during 
the same period. Pooling the risk across the two states delivered a loss ratio of 14.59. 
It should be noted that the loss ratios for shires in both states are not exactly halved 
because the number of shires in each states are not the same and they were not equally 
affected by drought every year.This explains why the pooling of risk across both 
states is not 11.38 (half of 22.76) but 14.59. The risk is further tempered at higher 
strikes as could be gleaned from the loss ratios. The standard deviations also revealed 
that the risk is higher for a single state than when risks are spatially pooled and higher 
strikes also delivered lower standard deviations. For instance, in Queensland, at the 5
th
 
percentile, the standard deviation is 3.35 but this steadily reduced to 2.51 and 1.47 
across the 10
th
 and 30
th
 percentile contracts. When risks are pooled, the standard 
deviation reduced to 2.62 which is lower than 3.35 for Queensland and 3.72 for 
Western Australia. The trend in lower standard deviations as the strike level increases 
persists for each shire and all shires. It could also be noted that loss ratios in Western 
Australia shires were more volatile than those of Queensland because they have 
higher standard deviations across the strikes.  
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Table 3.2: Estimated Annual Loss Ratios at different strike levels 
Year Strike = 5% Strike = 10% Strike = 30% 
 QLD WA All QLD WA All QLD WA All 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.09 
1972 1.21 0.00 0.43 1.11 0.80 0.92 2.48 1.92 2.15 
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.38 0.00 0.55 0.64 0.00 0.26 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.23 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.14 
1977 8.58 0.00 3.08 7.33 0.03 2.94 5.18 0.57 2.44 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.20 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.22 0.53 0.83 0.71 
1980 0.00 6.13 3.93 0.21 5.75 3.54 2.50 3.66 3.19 
1981 0.00 0.19 0.12 0.00 0.79 0.48 0.00 1.21 0.72 
1982 3.44 1.07 1.92 4.97 0.84 2.49 2.80 1.19 1.85 
1983 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.24 
1984 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 
1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.00 1.84 1.09 
1986 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.20 0.24 
1987 0.00 3.08 1.98 0.00 2.40 1.44 0.07 2.02 1.23 
1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.15 
1989 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.35 0.36 
1990 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.11 0.41 0.99 0.75 
1991 0.09 0.00 0.03 3.99 0.00 1.59 3.65 0.07 1.52 
1992 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.10 2.24 0.00 0.91 
1993 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.86 0.00 0.35 
1994 19.30 0.42 7.20 12.98 1.21 5.91 5.82 2.58 3.89 
1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.31 
1996 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.21 
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.49 
1998 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.09 
1999 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 
2000 0.00 1.70 1.09 0.00 2.80 1.68 0.91 3.66 2.54 
2001 0.00 2.96 1.90 0.00 4.59 2.76 0.00 2.55 1.52 
2002 2.37 0.00 0.85 3.63 1.19 2.17 2.67 1.75 2.12 
2003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.17 
2004 1.67 0.00 0.60 1.50 0.00 0.60 1.09 0.95 1.01 
2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
2006 3.35 1.68 2.28 2.06 1.37 1.65 1.69 1.95 1.85 
2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.88 0.50 0.66 
2008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.60 0.36 
2009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.04 0.15 1.33 
2010 0.00 22.76 14.59 0.00 17.80 10.70 0.00 7.69 4.57 
Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SD 3.35 3.72 2.62 2.51 3.00 2.03 1.47 1.48 
 
1.12 
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9. Discussion 
 
Capturing the relative exposure of crops to risk at their different phenological stages 
is necessary to improve the relationship between yield and weather index as earlier 
noted in the work of Stoppa and Hess (2003). This could be achieved through 
optimization and expert weighting. We have used only the optimized model in this 
study. It was thought that hedging efficiency should result from the alteration of the 
distribution of the statistical efficiency across the quantiles on the yield–index 
relationship continuum as shown in the ordinary least square regression and quantile 
regression analyses. However, Vedenov and Barnett (2004) have shown that a strong 
statistical relationship between yield and index does not guarantee efficiency as we 
have also noted in this study. One could have insinuated that when the relationship is 
stronger at the lower tail there will be higher efficiency. This is true as in the cases of 
Balonne and Bendemere with higher relationships at the 5
th
, 10
th
 and 30
th
 percentiles 
than their corresponding upper tail quantiles but the cases of Pingelly and 
Ravensthorpe contradicted this possible conclusion. More complex multi-trigger 
indices may have to be designed to capture the relationship required for significant 
improvements in hedging efficiency. The other variables may include soil moisture 
and temperature.  
 
Furthermore, the pricing of weather index insurance contract does not capture the 
relative efficiency of the contracts. The most expensive contracts are not necessarily 
the most efficient and the cheapest contracts are not necessarily the least efficient. It 
seems that the actuarial burns analysis does not capture the relative efficiency of the 
contracts. This finding alludes to previous conclusions that data availability and 
methodological issues are among the bottlenecks hindering the proliferation of 
weather index insurance (Vedenov & Barnett 2004; Jewson & Brix 2005).  
In addition, our panel data analysis for each of the two states and the two states, 
combined, indicated that there was a panel effect. The implication is that weather 
indices would have to be designed to capture geographical diversity in order to 
capture differences like soil types. This study concurs with the recommendation by 
scholars like Vedenov and Barnett (2004) on the localization of weather index 
contracts. Unfortunately, the localization of the contract will erode the cost savings 
anticipated from the use of weather index insurance. This is because the insurer will 
not be able to take advantage of economy of scale in the design of the product. 
Another major finding of our study is that drought risk to the insurer is inversely 
proportional to strike levels, years of pooling and spatial pooling. These findings are 
in congruence with those of Chantarat (2009). Bardsley, Abey and Davenport (1984) 
implied that risk pooling could make weather index insurance more viable in 
Australia as we have equally noted. We further observed that the reduction in risk to 
the insurer’s portfolio arising from increase in contract strike comes at the cost of 
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reduced benefits to the insured. The analyses obviously captured the year 2010 flood 
and drought in Queensland and Western Australia respectively in that there was a 
very heavy payout in Western Australia but none in Queensland (Agnew 2011; Hicks 
2011).   
 
Hedging efficiency depends on the risk measures used particularly at the higher 
strikes. Although, the MRSL (Mean Root Square Loss) reduced the semi-variance in 
revenue, it does not always lead to higher revenues in years when droughts are 
experienced. However, the risk measures are more congruent at the extreme tail. For 
instance, MRSL indicated efficiency for 12 shires, only one of them contradicted the 
results from the CTE (Conditional Tail Expectation) at the 5
th
 percentile strike. At the 
10
th
 percentile strike, there were 13 shires benefiting from the contract based on 
MRSL but the CTE missed two of them. In the case of the 12 shires MRSL flagged as 
deriving value from the 30
th
 percentile contracts, 6 of them were not captured by 
CTE. The incongruence in the efficiency measures increased with the strike levels. 
Generally, it seems that the MRSL does not respond to strike leves like the CTE. The 
number of locations flagging efficiency reduced with the strke level under the CTE 
efficiency test whereas there seems to be a relative consistency of hedging efficiency 
across locations with the MRSL. The findings of Vedenov and Barnett (2004) are 
similar to ours in that they used three efficiency measures and the efficiency results 
were found to be closely related but not perfectly the same.  
 
Our study therefore suggests that insurers will be more comfortable bearing modest 
risk over the long term than the most extreme risks over the short term. To bear the 
extreme tail risk like the 5
th
 percentile contracts, reinsurance cost may have to be 
factored into the pricing of the contract making it more expensive for farmers. It is 
however reasonable to expect that the Australian community may still be better off 
insuring the risk of drought than following the current pattern of risk management as 
noted in Quiggin and Chambers (2004) . It is also expected that experience, over time, 
will prove the worth of the insurance as insured farmers weather the storms of 
droughts unlike their uninsured counterparts. The effect of the insurance could also be 
tempered as farmers pass on part of the cost to consumers. This implies that the 
society at large bears the cost of the insurance and therefore the problem of equity or 
politicization of drought response would not arise. This arrangement should be more 
equitable in that the proportion of the insurance an individual pays indirectly by 
buying the product is the extent to which the individual has consumed the product 
whereas, spending public tax payers fund to bail out farmers translates into an 
assumption that everyone consumes the product to an equal extent. The equity debate 
and politicization of drought response remain major considerations in the current 
Australian Drought Policy (Kimura & Anton 2011).   
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10. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The pricing of weather index insurance contracts would have to be localized thereby 
reducing the cost reduction benefits anticipated from its usage. Also, the use of 
actuarial burns analysis for the pricing appears to be pareto-inefficient in that it does 
not reflect the relative exposure of the locations to risk and hedging efficiency. We 
also noted that statistical efficiency does not proportionately translate into hedging 
efficiency. The insurer could temper the risk of a portfolio of weather index insurance 
contract by spatially and temporally pooling the risks. Higher strike contracts are 
more diversifiable than the lower strike contracts that correspond to the very extreme 
tail events and could require reinsurance. The insurer interested in weather index 
insurance could only look forward to profit in the long run.     
 
We recommend that researchers and practitioners investigate further into the 
methodological frameworks appropriate for the pricing of weather index insurance 
contracts and measurement of its efficiency. In addition, appropriate legal frameworks 
are required to enhance appropriate use of the products.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Pricing of optimized insurance contracts in percentage  
States and 
shires 
 
Strike levels in 
percentiles 
States and 
shires 
 
Strike levels in percentiles 
5th  
5th 
 
10th 
 
30th 
WA  
5th 
 
10th 
 
30th QLD 
Balonne 4.67 5.55 15.90 Boddington 2.84 4.32 9.11 
Booringa 4.07 5.20 14.71 Boyup Brook 3.19 3.44 6.84 
Bendemere 4.45 5.07 15.00 Broomehill 4.83 5.22 14.35 
Bungil 3.40 4.56 13.00 Bruce Rock 3.84 5.34 11.23 
Taroom 3.79 6.76 17.69 Corrigin 3.84 5.49 15.43 
Waggamba 2.71 6.16 16.57 Katanning 3.92 7.45 16.37 
Clifton  3.23 6.97 14.63 Kondinin 3.82 5.32 8.98 
Millmerran 4.73 5.15 11.11 Tammin 3.16 4.66 9.78 
    Pingelly 2.51 5.26 11.11 
    Ravensthorp
e 
2.68 4.56 13.18 
 
Appendix 2: The results of the random model for the shires in all and each state. 
Locations Y Coefficient Standard  
error 
Z P>\z\ 95%Confidence 
Interval limits 
R-Square Wald Chi Prob Chi 
Lower Upper 
All shires p 2.12 0.07 29.30 0.00 1.98  2.26 0.0000 858.68 0.00 
0.0000 
0.5446 
Constant 1.03-09 0.02 0.00 1.00 -0.05  0.05 
QLD 
shires 
P 2.10 0.08 26.43 0.00 1.94  2.26 0.0000 698.56 0.00 
0.0000 
constant 1.51-09 0.03 0.00 1.00 -0.06  0.06 0.6872 
WA shires p 2.10 0.08 26.43 0.00 1.94  2.26 0.0000 698.56 0.00 
0.0000 
constant 1.51-09 0.03 0.00 1.00 -0.06 0.06 0.6872 
  
 
